It has been recognized that when a durable goods manufacturer sells her output, she has an incentive to produce at a rate that will drive down the market price of her product over time. Because anticipation of declining prices makes consumers less willing to invest in owning the durable good, selling can be self-defeating for the manufacturer. If instead, the manufacturer leases her product, she can eliminate her own incentive to decrease the price over time, which allows her to extract larger rents from consumers. In this paper, we investigate how a durable goods manufacturer's choice between leasing and selling is affected by a complementary product that is produced by an independent firm. We show that a durable goods manufacturer who leases her product has an incentive to increase prices (by limiting the availability of her product) in response to the availability of a complement. Since this potential for opportunistic behavior discourages output of the complement, leasing can also be problematic. As a result, the durable goods manufacturer faces a trade-off between leasing, which commits her to not over-produce, and selling, which commits her to not under-produce. Our contribution is to identify this tradeoff and show how a durable goods manufacturer can use a combination of leasing and selling to balance its strategic commitment across both its own market as well as the complementary market.
Introduction
Many durable or semi-durable products are heavily influenced by the availability of complementary goods or services that can increase the value of the durable product. In many instances the lack of sufficient availability of complementary products can impede the success of a durable product.
Complementary relationships frequently arise in consumer electronics. For example, the demand for high definition television (HDTV) sets is highly dependent upon the availability of high-definition programming. In fact, although the scarcity of such programming has taken much of the blame for the disappointing rate of adoption of HDTV, it is widely anticipated that the recent launch of ESPN's high-definition channel will accelerate the rate of adoption of HDTV (Business Week, 2003) . Another example of a complementary relationship in consumer electronics is that between video-game stations and video-games.
In the automotive industry, complementarities affect the adoption of alternative fuel technologies such as hybrid and fuel cell vehicles, both of which depend upon the availability of complements.
For hybrids, batteries need to be replaced every couple of years, and greater availability of batteries decreases the overall cost of operating the vehicle. Fuel cell vehicles have an even stronger complementary dependence upon the availability of hydrogen fuel since they cannot be operated without near daily access to fuel. One reason why fuel cell cars have not been widely sold is the lack of widespread availability of hydrogen fuel. Energy companies and automotive firms are trapped in a chicken-and-egg problem in which each industry could benefit from increases in the other's output (Wall Street Journal, 2003) , but neither has an incentive to unilaterally increase its own production.
It has long been recognized that one of the strategic issues that a durable goods manufacturer (DGM ) faces is that of mitigating the potential for her own opportunistic behavior with respect to consumers. This issue arises because, when a durable goods monopolist sells her product, she has an incentive to skim the demand curve by producing at a rate that, over time, drives down prices and decreases the market value of owning the product. In anticipation of this opportunistic behavior, consumers are less willing to "invest" in ownership. This issue has been referred to as time-inconsistency in reference to the fact that a monopolist's ability to sell a durable good a price above marginal cost is inconsistent with her own incentives to produce at a rate that causes the price of the product to decrease. If the DGM could make a credible commitment to her future output, then she could avoid the problem created by time inconsistency. Unfortunately, in practice it is often impossible for a DGM who sells her output to make such a commitment credible, since there is a strong incentive to renege.
However, one well known way for a DGM to eliminate the problem of time inconsistency is to lease the product to the consumer instead of selling it. Leasing gives a monopolistic DGM control over the market for used goods, eliminating her own incentive to produce at a rate that drives down prices. However, as much as leasing eliminates the time inconsistency problem, it can create another problem in situations where consumers' valuations for the product depend upon the availability of complementary products. Generally, when two products are complementary to one another, the market price of each product is decreasing in its own quantity and increasing in the quantity of the other. As a result, if the two products are produced by two independent firms, there is an externality that gives each firm an incentive to produce less than would be necessary to achieve the first-best outcome. Because leasing provides the DGM with more flexibility to withhold the availability of her product, it can discourage output of the complement, and can be self-defeating.
However, we demonstrate that, by selling at least some portion of her output, the DGM can credibly commit to a greater availability of her product, thereby encouraging the output of a complement. In addition, we show how the DGM can use a mixture of selling and leasing to balance the need to manage the time inconsistency issue against the need to encourage the output of a complementary product.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review and analyze the relevant literature. In section 3, we develop a model to capture the interaction between the manufacturer of a durable product and a firm that produces a complementary product. We analyze how the strategic choice between leasing and selling can be used to the durable goods firm's advantage and extend our analysis to the case where the complementary market opens subsequent to the durable goods market. Finally, we summarize the managerial implications through a conceptual framework and point to directions for future research.
Literature Review
The study of durable goods has long been a central subject in the industrial organization literature.
It is well established that the durability of a product can interfere with a monopolistic manufacturer's extraction of rents from consumers. The reason for this, is that after a manufacturer sells its durable product to some subset of the market, it has an incentive to continue production, selling its output at lower and lower prices. Coase (1972) conjectures that if rational consumers anticipate this behavior, then prices should fall down to competitive levels. This issue has been referred to in the literature as time-inconsistency to reflect the fact that for a durable product, the traditional monopolistic model is inconsistent with the passage of time. This line of thought is formalized by Bulow (1982) and Stokey (1981) who propose that, by leasing its product, a durable goods manufacturer can avoid the time inconsistency problem. Bulow (1982) also suggests that while leasing helps the firm to retain its monopoly power, selling also might have socially undesirable effects.
Later research identifies conditions under which the Coase conjecture does not apply, resulting in prices that are above marginal costs. Notable among these are the works by Conlisk et al. (1984) who model constant inflow of new consumers, Bond & Samuelson (1984) who incorporate replacement sales, Kahn (1986) who studies increasing marginal production costs and Bagnoli et al. (1980) who use discrete demand. In contrast to these papers, which consider a single durable product in isolation, Kuhn & Padilla (1996) show that when a monopolist manufacturer of a durable product also sells non-durable substitutes, the price of the durable will be above marginal cost.
Research on durable goods has been pursued in two main directions. The first of these examines the relationship between durability and a firm's incentive to innovate. Prominent among these are the works by Levinthal & Purohit (1989) and Waldman (1993) who argue that the incentive for a durable goods manufacturer to make the existing product obsolete by introducing a newer version is high and this can intensify the time inconsistency effect. In a related work, Dhebar (1994) analyzes the case when a monopolist supplies a series of durable products of increasing quality to a heterogeneous customer base and shows that intertemporal price discrimination issues in such circumstances could prevent a producer from credibly committing to future prices and qualities.
This can result in a situation where there is no equilibrium strategy. Kornish (2001) points out that an equilibrium strategy exists if the monopolist does not offer upgrade pricing. Also, Subramaniam & Srinivasan (1998) demonstrate how an introductory product strategy can be used to signal the trajectory of its cost curves to consumers. They show that firms can use a high introductory price to signal to consumers that cost reduction through learning experiences are low.
The other main direction in durable goods research explores the interaction between a firm's strategy for leasing / selling and the durability of its product. However, this line of research tends to focus on competitive, rather than complementary, interactions. Bulow (1986) models the durability choice in an oligopoly and finds that the lease/sales ratio is dependent on the number of firms in the market. Bucovetsky & Chilton (1986) demonstrate that selling can dominate leasing when there is a threat of entry from competitive firms or actual competition among firms. Competition is also examined by Desai & Purohit (1999) , who show that in a duopoly, firms tend to prefer selling over leasing when their products are sufficiently substitutable. They also demonstrate that a combination of leasing and selling might be the optimal strategy. In a separate work, Desai & Purohit (1998) also show that firms can employ leasing and selling as a mechanism to differentiate among consumers.
Our work also draws upon the literature on markets that involve either direct or indirect network effects. Katz & Shapiro (1994) categorize such markets and identify the issues which firms and consumers face while dealing with these markets. Farrell & Saloner (1986) investigate how the installed base for such products interacts with a firm's incentive to innovate and evaluate the welfare implications of certain strategies that firms might adopt. Similar issues are also considered by Katz & Shapiro (1985) ; Farrell & Saloner (1985) ; Choi (1994) . In another related work, Conner (1995) analyzes a market with direct network effects and suggests how a manufacturer can derive externality benefits from a lower quality version of its product that is produced by an imitator. Recent work by Parker & Van Alstyne (2001a,b) ; Rochet & Tirole (2001) also examines how complementary interactions between products could be used to stimulate demand and handle competitive influences from other firms, and thus, provide a rationale for cross-subsidization of products. However, most of this literature focuses on network externality issues and ignores the effect of the durability of a product under such situations.
Thus, while the effect of durability on the profitability of firms has been studied before, little attention has been paid to the interactions between durable goods and complementary products.
This aspect is important because the availability of such complements can stimulate demand for the durable good, enhancing the profits of its manufacturer. The contribution of our paper is to identify the trade-off that exists when durable goods interact with complementary products and to show how a durable goods manufacturer can manage this trade-off with its strategy for leasing and or selling its product.
The Model
Consider two complementary products, one of which is a durable good (DG). For simplicity, we assume that the other is a non-durable product or service, and refer to it as the complementary product (CP ). We assume that these two products are produced by different firms, which we refer to as the Durable Goods Manufacturer (DGM) and the Complementary Product Provider (CPP).
In order to represent durability, we adopt a variation of the two period linear demand model that Bulow (1982) proposed for durable goods. In this model, it is assumed that the durable good lasts for exactly two periods. Although there is no depreciation of its value between periods one and two, a discount factor of ρ is applied to revenues or cash flows received in period 2. Assuming that the durable good lasts for two periods is not critical; it is only important to assume that it lasts for a finite amount of time, so that optimal decisions can be calculated in a recursive fashion. The assumption that there is no depreciation simplifies the presentation of our analysis. Although our model can easily be generalized to allow for depreciation, this blurs the distinction between durable and non durable goods. Note that the assumption of no depreciation is consistent with that of Bulow (1982) and Bucovetsky & Chilton (1986) .
As in the Bulow (1982) model, we assume that consumers' utility for the DG is defined by the value of the service it provides. In each period, there are M potential consumers, each of whom has valuation v d for each period of service from the DG and can consume at most one unit of it. In the absence of the CP, the valuation v d for the service of the DG has a distribution that is uniform over this population on the interval
some consumers have negative valuations for the DG. As we will soon see, this ensures that there are some consumers who derive a positive utility from the DG only when it is used in combination with the complement. Note that a product can yield a negative utility if the costs of shopping for and obtaining it outweigh the benefits of ownership. Although our results do not necessarily require negative valuations, we do require that, at equilibrium, some consumers will not pay for access to DG, i.e. the market is not covered. As long as the market is not covered, a change in the price of the DG will affect the number of consumers who use it.
We also require that either the same set of M consumers be present in both periods, or that the DG can be bought and sold among consumers with no transaction costs, i.e. there is a perfect second-hand market. As discussed in Bulow (1982) this existence of a perfect second-hand market allows for the possibility that a different set of M consumers may be doing the demanding in each period. Bulow provides a compelling illustration of this possibility with an example about baby strollers. Although the number of consumers demanding baby strollers is stable, the specific set of consumers who demand a baby stroller this year is not composed of the same individuals who demanded baby strollers last year. The existence of a second-hand market ensures that, in period 2, all of the units that are available to the market, including those sold in period 1, are allocated to the consumers with the highest valuations.
If either the same set of consumers are present in both periods or there is a perfect secondhand market, then the price that a consumer is willing to pay for ownership of the DG in the first period will be equal to the sum of his valuation v d and the anticipated second period market price, discounted by ρ. It follows that if consumers anticipate that a DGM will have an incentive to produce at a rate that decreases the market price for her product in the second period, they will be less willing to pay for ownership of the product in the first period.
For the CP, we assume that each consumer purchases a scalar amount, and that each consumer's marginal valuation for additional units of the CP is linearly decreasing. In addition, we allow for a Thus far, we have described a model of consumers' independent valuations for the DG and the CP, i.e. how they value each product in the absence of the other. However, to capture the complementary nature of the two products, we must also define how a consumer's use of one product affects his utility for the other. Complementary products are those for which a consumer's utility from using both of them together is greater than the sum of the utilities that he would have received from using each product separately. For example, a consumer who has the use of a high definition television (HDTV) can obtain some utility from it by watching non-HD programming. This same consumer would derive some utility for HD programming, even if he had to view it on a non-HD television. However, the total value that this consumer derives from having both an HDTV and HD programming is greater than the sum of the independent valuations that he would have for these products separately. To represent this complementary effect, let us introduce k as a parameter of complementarity. We propose the following utility function for a consumer whose independent valuation for the DG is v d when the per-unit prices for the DG and the CP are p d and p c respectively:
where y is the amount of the complement that he consumes, δ = 1 if he has the use of the DG, and δ = 0 otherwise. From (3.1), it can be shown that at price p c , a utility maximizing individual consumer with valuation v d for the DG would consume
units of the CP. Thus, at a given price p c , access to the use of the DG increases the amount of the CP that he consumes by k units.
To determine how the CP affects a consumer's willingness to pay for the DG, we must consider his total utility as a function of the price of the CP. If the price of the CP is p c , and the consumer's independent valuation for the DG is v d , then the use of the DG increases his total utility by the following amount:
Note that the latter term in this expression represents the amount by which the availability of the CP increases a consumer's willingness to pay for the DG. Thus, if the price charged for use of the DG for a single period is p d , then all consumers with an independent valuation of more than
will pay for access to the DG, and the total number of consumers who pay to use the service of the DG will be:
To facilitate the analysis, we will introduce several restrictions upon our parameters:
The first of these restrictions is sufficient to guarantee that at equilibrium, Q ≤ M , i.e. some consumers will not have the use of the DG. This plays a major role in our results since it implies that a decrease in the price of the DG leads to more consumers having access to it, which increases demand for the CP. Note that because we have assumed that a c ≥ 0, assumption (3.5) also implies that
The restriction shown in (3.6) implies that, at equilibrium, all consumers purchase a positive amount of the CP, even those who lack access to the DG. Although this restriction simplifies the mathematical analysis, our results do not depend upon it qualitatively. Thus, even though (3.6) precludes the case in which a c = 0, by sacrificing some clarity of exposition, our results can be extended to include this case as well. Note that the assumption that φ ≥ 0 implies that the right-hand-side of (3.5) is larger than the right-hand-side of (3.6).
Under the assumptions above, Q ≤ M , and in (3.4) the term 
Since each consumer's consumption of the CP depends upon whether he has the use of the DG, the total consumption of the CP at price p c can be expressed as follows:
Note that in the case where φ = 0, each consumer's consumption of the CP depends only on p c and whether or not he has access to the DG. Each consumer who does not have access to the DG consumes a c − γp c units of the CP, while each one who has access consumes a c + k − γp c units of the CP. As a result, when φ = 0, the total consumption of the CP would be M (a c − γp c ) + kQ.
From (3.4) and (3.7), we can derive the following inverse demand functions for the DG and the CP respectively:
where p d (Q, y) is the implicit single period rental price for the DG when there are Q units of the DG and y units of the CP available to consumers. The inverse demand function for each of these products is decreasing in its own quantity and increasing in the quantity of the other product. This represents an externality so that, when the two firms act simultaneously and independently, they will set quantities too low (prices too high) to achieve the first-best outcome. This externality could be partially mitigated if one of the two firms could move first to provide a credible commitment to its output quantity. However, it is often difficult to identify a mechanism for making such a commitment credible. We will argue that selling can provide the DGM with such a mechanism.
In all of our analysis, we assume that the marginal costs of production for both the DGM and the CPP are constant, and for ease of exposition we normalize these costs to zero. Although the assumption of linear production cost is simplistic, it is not unreasonable in a wide variety of settings.
Moreover, the fundamental interaction between the selling vs. leasing strategy of the DGM and the complementary product requires only that the marginal production costs be non-decreasing.
The Sales and Leasing Strategy
We can now begin to explore how the profits of both firms are influenced by the DGM 's decision regarding the extent to which she will lease or sell her product. As shown in Figure 1 , consumers have three options with respect to the DG in period 1: they can purchase, lease, or go without the use of it. In period 2, consumers who purchased in period 1 can either continue to use their product or sell it at the market price. Consumers who leased or did without the DG in period 1 can either buy it or do without it in period 2. Note that in period 2, leasing and buying are indistinguishable since either one provides one period of use of the DG. In each period, each consumer also determines the amount of the CP that he will consume.
Let Q 1 be the total quantity that the DGM distributes in the first period, and let α ∈ [0, 1] be the fraction of this quantity that she leases. Let Q 2 be the quantity that the DGM introduces to the market in period 2, and let Q T 2 be the total number of units of the DG that are in use in period 2. Let y 1 and y 2 denote the CPP 's first and second period output quantities.
In order to proceed with the analysis for the DGM 's strategy for leasing or selling, we must first establish the role that is played by the second-hand market. Recall that we have assumed that there is a perfect second-hand market that allows the DG to be bought and sold without transaction costs. This has two important implications. First, it implies that all of the (1 − α)Q 1 units that the DGM sells in period 1 are potentially available in the second-hand market in period 2. As a result, these units compete with any additional (Q 2 ) units that the DGM sells/leases in period 2, and the total quantity of the DG that will be available to the market in period 2 will be Q T 2 = Q 2 + (1 − α)Q 1 . Note that, although Q 2 can include units that were leased in period 1, the DGM has no obligation to make the leased units from period 1 available to the market in period 2. However, it can be verified that, for any fraction α ∈ [0, 1], of leasing in the first period, if the DGM leases a conditionally optimal quantity, Q * 1 (α) in the first period, then it will never be in her interest to withhold these units from the market in period 2.
The other important implication of the perfect second-hand market is that it provides a mechanism for guaranteeing that the Q T 2 = Q 2 + (1 − α)Q 1 units of the DG that are available in period 2 will be allocated to the consumers with the highest valuations for it. Otherwise, there would be opportunities for Pareto-improving trade between low valuation and high valuation consumers. Thus, the market prices for the DG and the CP in period 2 will be p d (Q T 2 , y 2 ) and p d (Q T 2 , y 2 ) respectively. We can now proceed with the standard backward induction approach to determine the DGM 's optimal selling / leasing strategy. In the second (final) period, the profits of the CPP can be expressed as:
and the DGM 's profits can be expressed as:
As is evident from these expressions, each of the two firms' second period profits are increasing in the amount of the other firm's product that is available. Taking first-order-conditions, we obtain the following second period response functions for the DGM and the CPP respectively:
From these response functions, we can confirm that each firm's optimal output is increasing in the quantity of the other firm's product that is available. These expressions provide insight about why the DGM might want to sell her product in period 1: By doing so, she can make a credible commitment about the amount of her product that will be available in the second period. From (3.12), it can be seen that the amount, Q 2 (Q 1 , α, y), of the DG that is released in period 2 is decreasing in the amount, (1 − α)Q 1 , that is sold in period 1. However, the total amount of the DG that will be in use in the second period, Q 2 (Q 1 , α, y) + (1 − α)Q 1 , is increasing in the amount sold in period 1. If the DGM could somehow make a credible commitment to make a given amount of her product available in period 2 without selling it in the first period, then she would no doubt benefit from doing so in order to encourage a higher level of output of the CP. However, making such a commitment credible would be a major obstacle since the DGM would have a strong incentive to renege.
It follows that the strategic motivation for selling is that it allows the DGM to demonstrate a higher propensity to make her product available in the future, thereby encouraging output of the complement. As a consequence, the question of selling versus leasing is most interesting when the DGM has no other mechanism for making a such a credible commitment. Our purpose is to recognize the strategic benefit of selling as a means of encouraging output of a complementary product rather than to compare different mechanisms for making quantity commitments. Therefore, we assume that within each of the two periods, neither the DGM nor the CPP are able to credibly commit to the amount of their product that they will produce in that period.
By simultaneously solving (3.12) and (3.13), we have that the second period quantities will be the following function of the amount of the durable good that was available in the first period and the fraction of these units that was leased:
where:
To fully understand the impact of the DGM 's first period strategy on the firms' profits, we need to look at the effect of the first period decisions on the second period quantities of both firms. The first period decisions that the DGM faces are: (1) total quantity to be made available in the first period and (2) fraction of this quantity to be leased. The DGM 's flexibility to control the second period market price of her product is directly related to the extent to which she employs leasing. By leasing her products, the DGM retains the flexibility to increase price by restricting the availability of her product in period 2, thereby appropriating a larger share of the surplus due to complementarity. However, because the CPP will reduce his output in anticipation of this opportunistic behavior, leasing can be self-defeating for the DGM. Alternatively, by shifting to a greater proportion of selling in the first period, and effectively relinquishing her flexibility to restrict the availability of her product and increase prices, the DGM can encourage a greater supply of the complementary product.
From (3.14) and (3.15), it is evident that the second period output quantities of both firms are influenced by the amount of the DG that is sold in the first period. Assuming that both firms behave rationally and have access to the same information, their second period profits can be expressed as functions of Q 1 and α. Let us introduce the following definitions:
Let us now consider how the first period prices are affected by the DGM 's decisions about selling or leasing her product. Because consumers value only the service of the DG, the lease price in the first period depends only upon the total quantity of the DG and the CP that are currently available.
Thus, using (3.8) and (3.9),the first period lease price for the DG is equal to p d (Q 1 , y 1 ) ,while the first period price for the complement is equal to p c (Q 1 , y 1 ).
To determine the price that the DGM can obtain from any units that she sells, we must consider the additional value that a consumer will derive from purchasing the product instead of leasing it.
Under the assumption that consumers can buy or sell the DG through a perfect second-hand market, the additional value that a consumer derives from purchasing instead of leasing is the discounted market price for the product in period 2. This market price, p d (Q * 2 (Q 1 , α) , y * 2 (Q 1 , α)), is independent of an individual consumer's valuation and can be fully anticipated by rational consumers.
Therefore, in spite of having different valuations for the DG, consumers will be homogeneous with respect to the premium that they will pay to buy instead of lease the product. That is, all consumers whose valuations are sufficiently high that they use the DG in period 1 will be indifferent between leasing and buying. 1 Thus, the price for which the DGM can sell (1 − α)Q 1 units in period 1, given that she leases αQ 1 units and that consumers anticipate profit maximizing behavior from both the DGM and the CPP is:
where ρ is the discount factor applied to the anticipated second period market price for the DG.
It follows that, at the beginning of period 1, the profit functions for the two firms can be expressed as:
Proposition 3.2 a) The DGM's total profits are maximized when:
and the fraction of leasing that maximizes the DGM's profits is:
, and α * = 1 if and only if k = 0. c) α * is decreasing in k and increasing in M , γ, and φ .
From the above proposition, pure leasing is optimal if and only if the there is no interaction between the two products (k = 0). As the complementarity (k) between the products increases, it 1 Because the assumption of a perfect second-hand market insures that the Q T 2 units of the DG that are available in period 2 are allocated to the consumers with the highest valuations and that the market price will be p d (Q T 2 , y2), our model is indifferent with respect to which of the individual first period consumers lease vs. buy the DG.
becomes more important for the DGM to commit to a larger availability of her product in period 2, and she does so by selling a greater portion of her output.
However, the DGM 's incentive to sell decreases when there are increases in either: consumers' sensitivity (γ) to the price of the complement, the number (M ) of consumers, or the tendency (φ) for consumers who have high valuation for the DG to also have higher marginal utilities for the CP. Higher sensitivity to the price of the complement tends to weaken the strength of the complementary interactions, which causes the DGM to behave more like she would in the absence of the complement, i.e. by leasing more. The reason that an increase in the total number of consumers discourages selling is that, for a fixed value of a d , an increase in M would add consumers at the low end of the spectrum of valuations for the DG. Recall that v d has a distribution that is uniform over the interval [a d − M, a d ], and that, at equilibrium, the consumers at the bottom of this spectrum consume only the CP. Thus, the appropriate interpretation of this result is that as the number of consumers who consume only the CP increases, the CPP 's pricing decision is less heavily influenced by the availability of the DG. This reduces the DGM 's incentive to use selling as a mechanism for committing to a greater availability of her product.
Finally, to understand why the proportion of leasing is increasing in φ, recall that φ represents the strength of the relationship between a consumer's valuation for the DG and his marginal utility for the CP. When φ = 0, all consumers have the same marginal utility for the complement, so that each additional consumer who gains access to the DG will consume the same amount of the complement. In contrast, when φ > 0, consumers with larger valuations for the DG also have larger marginal utility for the CP. In this case, each additional consumer who gains access to the DG has less marginal utility for the complement. This tends to reduce the strategic incentive for the DGM to commit to a greater availability of her product by selling.
The equilibrium prices and quantities for the DG and the CP can be seen in Table 1 . From the results in this table, we can establish the following:
Corollary 3.1 When the DGM follows her optimal strategy: a) Both the price and quantity of the complement are higher in the second period than in the first. b) The total availability of the DG is higher and implicit lease price is lower in the second period than in the first.
In the second period, time inconsistency pushes the DGM to increase the availability of her product. In traditional models, this increased availability serves only to drive down the implicit lease price of the DG. However, in the presence of a complement, the increased availability of the DG also stimulates demand for the CP. The CPP responds to this by increasing both its output and its price. Thus, the CPP is able to reap benefits of both higher margins and larger output as a result of the strategic commitment that the DGM makes by selling some of her output in the first period.
Is Pure Selling Ever Optimal?
In the previous section, we showed that, for our model, pure leasing is optimal when complementarity vanishes, i.e. k = 0. However, although the proportion of leasing is decreasing in k and increasing in M , γ, and φ, it is always strictly positive. This leads to the question of whether complementary effects could ever be sufficiently strong that it would be optimal for a DGM to sell all of her output.
In seeking to answer this question, it can be observed that, in practice, CPP s often wait for some time after the introduction of a DG before introducing their products. For example, Electronic Arts and other game producers waited three to four years after the introduction of Microsoft's Xbox and Sony's PlayStation 2 before flooding the market with software releases (Business Week, 2004 ). In addition, Gupta et al. (1999) performed an empirical study that showed how a limited availability of programming restricted the demand of the HDTVs. To investigate how production lead times for complementary products affect the DGM 's strategy, we consider a variation on our original model and assume that the CP is not available until the second period, i.e. y 1 = 0. We characterize the optimal decisions of both firms in the same way as in the previous sections.
, the profits of the DGM are maximized with the following combined quantity of leasing and selling in period 1: (3.19) and the fraction of leasing is:
In this case, 0 < α * ≤ 1, and pure leasing, i.e. α * = 1 is optimal if and only if k = 0.
is optimal and:
Recall that when the CP is available in both periods, pure selling is never optimal. However, the above result shows that when the availability of the CP is delayed, pure selling can be an optimal strategy for the DGM. The intuition for why a delay in the availability of the CP tends to increase the proportion of selling can be explained as follows: Regardless of when the CP becomes available, selling stimulates only the second period output of the CP. When the availability of the CP is delayed, second period profits represent a larger portion of the DGM 's total profits. As a result, it becomes more important for her to provide a credible commitment to the quantity of her product that will be available. Note that when the marginal utility for the CP is very high (part b of Theorem 3.3), pure selling alone does not provide a sufficiently strong level of commitment and the DGM increases her first period output beyond the myopically optimal amount, i.e.
2 . It is also worth noting that, although the optimal fraction of leasing in our original model, as shown in Proposition 3.2, is independent of a d and a c , this is not the case when the availability of the CP is delayed. In this case, α * is increasing in a d and decreasing in a c . As consumer's valuations for the DG increase, it becomes increasingly important for the DGM to address its time inconsistency problem than to encourage greater output of the CP.
Corollary 3.2 The threshold level of complementarity, k th , above which pure selling (α = 0) becomes optimal decreases with β = a c /a d i.e. Figure 2 , where it can be seen that a larger value of β = ac a d leads to a higher threshold of complementarity k above which pure selling dominates.
This is illustrated in

Leasing with option-to-buy
In many durable goods markets, e.g. automobiles, musical instruments, etc., it is common for firms to offer consumers leasing contracts that include options to purchase the product at the termination of the lease. GM's Smart Buy, Chrysler's Gold Key Plus, and Ford's Red Carpet Option are examples of some such contracts.
Because such leases are common in practice, it is worth commenting on how such leasing arrangements relate to our results. Recall that in our model, selling allows the DGM to alter her second period response function and effectively committing herself to having more units of her product in use than she would have if she relied entirely upon leasing. Consider now a DGM who leases all of her output in period 1, but is able to pre-commit to the price at which consumers can exercise an option-to-buy at the end of the period. By specifying an appropriate price at which consumers can exercise an option-to-buy, such a DGM can similarly alter her second period response function as a commitment to have more units of her product in use. Under this type of arrangement, it can be shown that at equilibrium the exercise price specified by the DGM will be equal to the market price for her product in period 2. It is also possible to show that by leasing all of her output in period 1 and also specifying an appropriate option-to-buy price, a DGM can induce the same availability of the complement and achieve the same profitability as is possible under a mixture of leasing and selling.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we examine the effect that a complementary product has on a durable goods manufacturer's strategy to lease or sell her products. We show that in the case that the complementary product is produced by another firm and the extent of complementarity is sufficiently strong, the durable goods manufacturer's preference for leasing will shift to selling. In the absence of complete contracts, selling can act as a commitment mechanism that can mitigate opportunistic behavior and encourage a larger supply of the complementary product.
From a managerial standpoint, we can represent the optimal strategy of the DGM as function of the ratio β = This can be depicted as shown in Figure 3 . When a DGM anticipates a large independent marginal utility for a strongly complementary product, selling should represent a large proportion of the total distribution of her product, and if the availability of the complement is delayed, even a pure selling strategy may be optimal. Conversely, when complementary effects are weak, due to either a small individual marginal utility for the complementary product or to a low level of interaction between the two products, the firm should shift toward leasing. In all the cases we have considered, selling acts a Pareto-improving mechanism by allowing higher profits for both the CPP and the DGM. The firms are better off because they are able to generate higher profits and the consumers are better off because greater quantities of both products are available.
Although our analysis is based on the assumption that a single firm that produces the complementary product, most of our results extend qualitatively to the case in which the complementary market is open to entry. Moreover, in a separate analysis, we have confirmed that, as the cost of entry to the complementary market decreases, the DGM will tend to increase the proportion of selling in her strategy.
One interesting situation in which the results of our model could be applied is the one that arises when demand for at least one of the two products would not exist without the availability of the other one. For example, demand for video-games that are compatible with the Sony Playstation would not exist without the availability of the PlayStation and vice-versa. Such products that depend entirely upon the availability of another product have been described as contingent (See Peterson & Mahajan (1978) ). To formally address such products in our model would require setting either a d = 0 or a c = 0, the latter of which is precluded by assumption (3.6). However, it is worth noting that the purpose of this assumption is only to stream-line the mathematical analysis.
Without assumption (3.6), it is possible that some consumers would consume 0 units of the CP, and y T (p c , p d ) as shown in (3.7) would be quadratic in p c . Although this would make the analysis much more messy, it would not affect the qualitative insights.
In an attempt to validate our result that a DGM should employ less leasing for products that have strong complementary interactions, we contacted a number of automobile dealerships that carry both hybrid and traditional combustion engine vehicles. We argue that hybrids have a moderately strong complementary dependence on the availability of batteries, which need to be replaced periodically. Note that although both hybrid and traditional vehicles depend on the availability of gasoline, this is a relatively weak complementarity since the output of a single manufacturer of a gasoline consuming product has a negligible effect on the availability of gasoline. (In our model, this would be represented by increasing the parameter M to represent a situation in which the number of consumers who have positive independent valuation of a particular DG are only a small fraction of the population that has some utility for the CP.) Out of the five dealers that we contacted, all reported that leasing represents between 50-67% less of their business in hybrids than in traditional vehicles. This is very consistent with our results, especially in view of the fact that the hybrid market is currently much less competitive than that for traditional vehicles, which would normally suggest that there would be more leasing in the hybrid market (see Desai & Purohit (1999) ).
One can argue that the complementary dependence between fuel cell vehicles and hydrogen fuel is even stronger than that between hybrid vehicles and batteries. Thus, our results would suggest that if early entrants in the fuel cell vehicle market are dependent on third parties to provide hydrogen fuel, they should sell their products in order to encourage greater fuel availability. Of course, an alternative strategy would be for the manufacturer of such a vehicle to also provide the fuel supply, eliminating the complementary hold-up problem altogether.
It is also of interest to compare our results to the recent developments in HDTV programming.
While leasing was initially the dominant model for distribution of HDTV set-tops used by cable service providers, the last few years have seen an increasing tendency for these firms to sell their Our paper makes three main contributions. First, we identify the trade-offs faced by a DGM whose product interacts with complements. Second, we have developed a simple micro-model of consumer utility for a durable good and a complementary product. Finally, we have used this model to demonstrate how a DGM can mitigate the adverse effects of its own potential to behave opportunistically with respect to both consumers and complementors.
One direction for future research would be to consider other mechanisms that could induce greater levels of investment from complementary firms. Committing to prices and quantities to mitigate hold-up is prevalent when firms are related vertically. However, these mechanisms need explicit contracts and hence enforceability could be an issue when firms are not directly related.
Another direction in which our work could be extended would be to relax the assumption that both firms and consumers have perfect information about the cost structure and market characteristics. This is certainly not true under all circumstances, and it would be of interest to understand how a firm's private information would affect her strategy for leasing and selling her products. An empirical analysis of the model complementarity and durability as presented in this paper would also serve to improve our understanding of such markets. 
